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Abstract
This article discusses recent structural changes in Turkish higher education to draw
attention to a number of social and economic consequences of this expansion in terms of
mobility and inequality over the last ten years. First, we outline the institutional back-
ground of the expansion of higher education in order to identify various re-distributive
dimensions of the policy. Compared to 2004, creating new universities and increasing the
existing capacity almost doubled the college enrollment rates. Subsidies facilitating more
education grants and fee waivers were followed by heavy investment in public student
accommodation. This policy was initiated as a political move targeting regional devel-
opment, taking on a redistributive character by reorienting public funds toward poorer
eastern regions. In this paper, we limit our focus to the impacts of these policies on the
local labor market. By using household labor force surveys between 2004 and 2014, firstly,
we explored how college proximity had an effect on access to college for the local families.
Our results from a difference-in-difference model provide evidence that this policy had an
equity-enhancing effect for daughters of low-educated families in some regions with large-
scale expansion. The results also indicate that the regional mobility of educated workers
may be slowed by this expansion. Secondly, we investigated whether the compositional
change has affected local returns to college degrees and relative convergence across regions.
Estimation results show that despite the increase in college graduates, returns in terms of
wages at the local level are increasing and that some regional convergence was attained.
Finally, we discuss segmentation of Turkey’s labor force in terms of education levels and its
impact on earnings-age profiles by contrasting 2004 and 2014.
Keywords: I23, I26, R23
JEL Classification: Higher education, Returns to education, regional labor markets, College
proximity, Turkey
1 Introduction
Institutions designing higher education have economic and social significance by determining
and reproducing selection mechanisms which match ability and rewards in a society. We can
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define two channels through which public expenditure can increase access to higher education.
In countries where higher education is dominated by the public sector, the main channel is the
educational capacity decided by governments while the second is the lowered cost of attending
and graduating from college that increases access. If tuitions are not substantial, public grants
and accommodation facilities can help to sustain equality of opportunities (Curs et al., 2011).
Otherwise, increased capacity can be equity impeding, meaning that only wealthier families can
afford the cost.This longstanding debate was widely discussed in the early 1970s (Hansen and
Weisbrod, 1969), particularly regarding the question is of whether allocating more resources and
higher education subsidies are equity enhancing or equity impeding. More recent discussion
has focused on the positive and negative selection of likely college attenders due to expansion.
Choi (2015) studied the causal impact of expansion on college access using a counter-factual
analysis to include compliers before and after expansion. Our study, however, focuses more
on treatment at the regional level. Brand and Xie (2010) found a negative selection effect of
expansion, which is less relevant for Turkey’s case, where selection is more centralized and the
gender dimension of the proximity effect favors the positive selection argument. We argue that
besides a means-tested grant system, college proximity is one of the important factors reducing
the cost of attending a college. These factors can be operational unless the bottleneck created
for selection mechanism works according to equity and efficiency principles.
Explaining a country-specific selection mechanism requires understanding of the political
and institutional background. For Turkey, the selection mechanism of the higher education
system is itself an institution with roots in the pre-democratic era dating back to the foundation
of the Republic. Secondly, Turkey’s higher education institutions have a dynamic character
necessary to keep up with the contemporary conditions of an emerging democratic society.
The evolving need for institutional change in higher education is thus a political issue since,
to a certain extent, any modification requires public consent regarding its economic and social
consequences. Furthermore, there is the important issue of public finance for the burdensome
costs of higher education, which has a re-distributive character. One recently emerging field of
research deals with the political economy of higher education in terms of public finance.
To the degree that the expansion of higher education reaches a wider portion of society and
hence has a more egalitarian character involving a more democratic contribution, it is likely
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that the political landscape and competition will change in the long run. Iversen and Stephens
(2008), however, notes that higher education seems less re-distributive than public investment
in primary and secondary education. In this paper, we will draw attention to the social and
economic changes that can be related to Turkey’s expansion of post-secondary education.
Our main argument is that, since 2006, newly emerging universities have expanded into
relatively less developed regions, which has substantially changed the share of enrolled college
students. We first discuss the institutional and historical background of higher education before
providing some figures related to the magnitude of the expansion.
The following sections provide a brief economic and political account of recent develop-
ments around the latest expansion of higher education in Turkey. In the first section, we provide
a short history of higher education institutions and the major changes that they underwent.
We draw attention to changes in selection mechanisms, such as the central entrance exam in-
troduced in 1974 and restrictions imposed by the National Security Council in 1996. We then
discuss why investing in higher education is politically desirable in terms of capacity building
and local development. We argue that the new universities founded during the rule of the
Justice and Development Party (JDP)1 have contributed to local development via a repriori-
tization of public investments and demand externalities through increased public grants and
accommodation facilities targeting college students. In this sense, the expansion in 2006 offers
beneficial local political windfalls as well as equality enhancing educational opportunities. It
seems that this policy shift will have some long-term consequences that will affect Turkey’s
social and economic structure. We focus on two interesting outcomes, namely localization and
convergence of poor regions in labor market returns to education. We find that local enrollment
has increased for both boys and girls following the capacity increase in new universities. More
specifically, for girls, we find that low-educated families have benefited more from college
proximity. The final section discusses the impact of increased numbers of college graduates
on relative returns to education. Regional estimates of wage regressions before and after the
expansion show that there is a convergence in terms of marginal returns of graduating from
college.
1JDP is the translation of the Turkish name for Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP)
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2 Investing in Higher Education
During its relatively long tenure in government, JDP has shown its willingness to expand higher
education and improve access in favor of its electorate2, but without paying much attention
to the lagging changes in institutional structure.3 Investing in post-secondary education and
opening new universities yields development and economic rents besides political and social
ones. Firstly, the institutional framework of budgetary expenditure encourages central gov-
ernments to pursue large scale public investment at the local level. Turkey remains one of
the few OECD countries where public finance is mostly centralized (Blöchliger and Rabesona,
2009). Large-scale expenditure is financed through central government grants and executed
via governors (local appointees of central government) while Turkey’s local governance system
gives only very limited appropriations to mayors, who are the only elected local authority in
each province. In this respect, the local spending-revenue balance depends mostly on political
maneuvering in order to address locals’ demands for easier access to higher education. This po-
litical intermediation gives more weight to pork-barrel/patronage politics, which in turn makes
central government a key actor for the provision of public goods at the local level. Özcan (2006)
discusses the issue of large-scale local spending around three development projects4 initiated
with the approval of central government that failed due to the inability of local political groups
and the central authority to coordinate.
2.1 Political and Institutional Background
Besides serving to secure higher social status, tertiary education in Turkey has also been valued
as a means of upward mobility in income and lifestyle. Low average education levels and
limited access to higher education justify social aspirations related to the importance of being
educated. Table 1 illustrates the relationship between intergenerational educational mobility
and income as of 2007. The educational divide between income quantiles, implying higher
returns for better-educated people, are not unexpected. What is surprising, however, is the
importance of the father’s education level, indicating that social inheritance fundamentally
2Bas¸levent et al. (2005) finds that JDP’s electoral base comprises young male voters who are pro-European and
more inclined to vote according to economic concerns.
3Political upheaval will not be discussed.
4One of them is the local industrial project (military tank production) that the local university, Erciyes University,
takes part in for the province of Kayseri, (Özcan, 2006).
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influences children’s education. On average, most adults attain the same education level as
their father. Strikingly, for the highest (college) and lowest (less than secondary) education
levels, the probabilities of children matching their father’s education level are very close, at
66% and 68% respectively. 1, however, only presents a partial picture as it does not sufficiently
reflect the barriers that had led to the creation of different various new social and political
institutions. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed growing institutional investment by the so-called
conservative social class or the periphery (with the social cleavage termed by Mardin (1973)).
In simple terms, 1 indicates that wealthier families had more resources to send their children
to college. In order to understand how students sort at post-secondary level, we have to give a
brief history of university entrance procedures in Turkey. Until 1974, the selection mechanism
was decentralized, being left to the discretion of universities. Then, a universalized system was
implemented, with a central exam that was intended to offer fair evaluation for students from
poorer families.5 Borrowing Mardin’s division concept, this change in selection narrowed
the center-periphery gap in higher education. However preparation for the entrance exam
requires families to use extra resources to send their children to better high schools or attend
private tutoring classes . Thus, in terms of inequality between loosely defined social classes,
the central entrance exam posed a challenge that led to the private provision of services inside
Islamic or conservative organizations or networks to access higher education. In a sense,
the service they provide substitutes the public one by preparing students from relatively poor
family backgrounds for the central entrance exam for undergraduate studies. Specifically, these
services include grants covering expenses for private tutoring classes and financing a student
dormitory if these students are not able to afford or find a public one. The insufficient quality
of public high schools is compensated for by the private education that certain conservative
groups compete to provide. These network services, some of them substituting for the public,
continue to operate while students are at university and even after the graduation in the form
of career building. Network connections are mutually beneficial and can be defined as an
implicit contract between individuals and the network. In this way, religious networks justify
their social existence and finance the services they provide. In addition, the network, besides
all these benefits, decreases transaction costs related to job seeking and further helps to develop
5http://www.osym.gov.tr/belge/1-2706/tarihsel-gelisme.html
5
Table 1: Intergenerational Educational Mobility and Average Income Positioning
Less than Secondary Secondary Post-secondary
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Father Less than Secondary 2.32 0.68 3.13 0.24 4.23 0.08
Father Secondary 2.82 0.13 3.31 0.46 4.24 0.42
Father Post-secondary 2.57 0.04 3.59 0.30 4.38 0.66
Source: Author’s calculations based on 2007 Adult Education Survey (AES), include adults aged 25 years or above.
(1) Average score or positioning according to the quantiles of income (5 highest, 1 lowest).
(2) Education level conditional on father education. The numbers add to one across the rows for each father education level.
business relations inside networks.6
As higher education institutions change due to major bureaucratic or political interventions,
various social and individual strategies are needed to pass through the bottleneck created by
the central exam. To capture this institutional context, a brief history of developments related
to the university system is needed. Several major changes concern the selection mechanism
governing the transition from high school to post-secondary level and the regulations and
rules within universities. Until 1984 (except for some private enterprises in the mid-70s),
the university system was entirely dominated by public universities. After the military coup
in 1981, the higher education system fell under the control of a centralized institution and
began to operate under the supervision of the Council of Higher Education (COHE-YÖK).7
After legal restrictions were lifted in 1984 a new type of private (but non-profit institution or
vakif) university appeared. For the public universities, meanwhile, there were two waves of
proliferation. In the first wave in 1992, 22 new universities were founded under the rule of a
coalition of the center right (DYP) and center left (SHP). This was a political move to facilitate a
demand shift to the regions where each university campus was located. Higher local demand
externalities is a common argument of local interest groups. After the first wave, whereas the
number of state universities did not increase further, private (vakif) universities continued to
increase. By 2006, there were 77 universities, of which 24 are privately owned.8 In 2006, JDP
accelerated the creation of new universities, mostly in Anatolia, that had ceased after 1992. The
introduction of private universities provided easy access to tertiary education at a cost that was
particularly affordable to wealthier families whose children got lower scores in the entrance
exam.9 Since 2006, the number of state universities has nearly doubled to 103. The other
6These institutions financed by certain religious networks could only operate somewhat in a informal way.
7CoHE was designed by the military coup in a way that allowed it to involve itself in staff recruitment policy,
control budgetary decisions and regulate university elections.
8They are mainly located in two major cities, Istanbul and Ankara.
9Until 2006, private universities were located in two major cities, Istanbul and Ankara. In that sense, opening a
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reason was the promotion of the local development policy that new universities bring together,
(Arap, 2010). It is a way of importing demand for small cities that lack a large industrial sector.
The choice of location may depend on various factors. For example, McLendon et al. (2009)
found strong empirical evidence that, independent of other factors, partisanship, legislative
professionalism, term limits, interest groups and gubernatorial power influence appropriation
levels.
Political developments in the late 1990s led to a number of restrictions affecting educa-
tional equity and mobility. A social and political agenda to redesign the education system was
dictated to the coalition parties (True Path Party and Welfare Party10) by the military wing
of the National Security Council (NSC) in 1997. One of the major changes involved a new
selection mechanism that subjected religious vocational school graduates (RVS-imam-hatips)
to a reduced exam score coefficient that downgraded their total scores in the university central
exam. The rationale behind the coefficient factor that disadvantaged RVS graduates in entering
(or choosing) university faculties other than theology was to discourage families from send-
ing their children to religious schools if they wanted access to all options in post-secondary
education. This intervention in the selection process reduced the enrollment rates for RVS
(imam-hatips), with the number of students decreasing from 511,502 to 77,392 between 1997
and 2002, (Ozgur, 2011). Another NSC intervention related to the regulations dictated to the
CoHE was the reinforcement of the headscarf ban for female higher education students, which
had previously been left to the discretion of the authority of each university. The official prohi-
bition on the headscarf was not limited to universities but applied to all employees in all public
sectors as well.11 These restrictions meant that children with conservative (or religious) family
background faced a number of obstacles in accessing higher education. The challenges were
especially demanding for girls, starting at high school and even continuing during their work-
ing life, such as in the public sector where women are concentrated.12 Their job opportunities
were limited to the private sector, which is less developed in small cities. Such restrictions also
applied to children whose mother tongue is Kurdish and residing in underdeveloped regions
with poor family backgrounds. It is not possible to account for the gradual effect of these
private university in a relative poor region seems less profitable.
10A center right and Islamic party coalition.
11The rule that women wearing a headscarf are not allowed to become public servants dates back to the 1980
military coup.
12Lawyers, doctors and school teachers at every level are barred from wearing head scarves.
7
restrictions on educational and income inequality. The political claims to unwind disadvan-
tages were barely expressed or debated publicly following JDP’s first general election victory
in 2002. JDP’s political discourse seemed to be vaguely involved in these claims publicly, while
the headscarf ban was relaxed by decree in 2007 universities and no constitutional changes
were made until the referendum in 2013. Meanwhile, the imposition of different coefficients
for RVS ended in 2010 so entrance scores became based on a fair evaluation for students from
all high school types.
2.2 Redistribution and Regional Development
In this institutional setting, closing the welfare gap between regions and offering more egali-
tarian grant allocations are politically lucrative for the central government. Regionalisation of
the political landscape is a common finding in the voting literature, (Tezcür, 2012), (Bas¸levent
et al., 2005). Özcan (2006) suggests that devolution does not provide a clear solution to the
development problem, arguing that centralized government can enhance equity and efficiency
more than decentralized can. Luca and Rodríguez-Pose (2014) recently claimed that, under
JDP rule between 2004 and 2012, public investment was motivated by socio-economic princi-
ples rather than political motives, explaining this finding in terms of the Turkish bureaucracy’s
strong developmental state capacity. Further study is needed to identify the nature of such
policy (pork-barrel politics rather than patronage networks, which are hard to capture in a
macro analysis). Ultimately, the basic question is whether public goods are allocated on an
equity basis. In Greece, for example, Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2015) found that public funds are
allocated in favor of pork-barrel politics rather than principles aiming at reducing regional
disparities.
Investing in higher education in small cities and funding universities only represent a
limited part of public expenditure. We should note that public expenditure in Turkey related
to higher education has a separate budgeting procedure and is not reported as grants from
central government to local authorities. Local authorities are not entitled to finance major
development projects through their own budgets without the approval of central government.
Table 2 displays to the extent that each wave of new universities changed the composition of
expenditure in the consolidated budget in different years.
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Table 2: Reprioritization and Share of Public Universities*
Years All Before 1992 Between 1992-2006 After 2006
(1) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
1990 4.123 4.123 1.00 - - - -
1991 3.960 3.960 1.00 - - - -
1992 4.318 4.318 1.00 - - - -
1993 3.696 3.396 0.92 0.300 0.08 - -
2000 2.684 2.064 0.77 0.620 0.23 - -
2005 3.403 2.530 0.74 0.874 0.26 - -
2006 3.092 2.270 0.73 0.806 0.26 0.016 0.01
2007 3.180 2.270 0.71 0.812 0.26 0.099 0.03
2008 3.240 2.152 0.66 0.865 0.27 0.223 0.07
2009 3.341 2.142 0.64 0.843 0.25 0.356 0.11
2010 3.514 2.151 0.61 0.837 0.24 0.525 0.15
2011 4.152 2.583 0.62 0.952 0.23 0.617 0.15
2012 3.939 2.317 0.59 0.901 0.23 0.721 0.18
Source: General Directorate of Budget and Fiscal Control. Last accessed on 22/06/2015 http://www.bumko.gov.tr/EN,2679/
budget-figures-and-budget-realizations.html
* Based on year of foundation
(1) The share of year-end expenditures in the Consolidated Central Budget. (2) Share in total budget of Universities.
The share of universities in the central government budget has been about 3-4% and fairly
stable despite the expansion of capacity with new universities. Table 2 provides evidence that
funds were reallocated in favor of new universities in each wave. Over nearly two decades,
the budget share of universities founded before 1992 declined to 59% while newly established
universities, located mostly in small cities, increased their funding. The latest figures show
that almost one fifth of the total university budget was spent on universities established under
JDP rule.
9
Ta
bl
e
3:
R
eg
io
na
lU
ni
ve
rs
it
y
En
ro
llm
en
ta
nd
R
eg
io
na
lS
ha
re
s
20
04
-2
01
2
Pr
ov
in
ce
s
N
ut
s2
En
ro
llm
en
tS
ha
re
En
ro
llm
en
tS
ha
re
of
G
ir
ls
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
04
20
12
20
04
20
12
Is
ta
nb
ul
1
14
6,
73
9
14
5,
39
4
14
3,
09
5
14
3,
40
9
14
7,
10
2
15
6,
86
8
16
8,
19
6
18
6,
89
7
21
0,
86
7
12
.3
1
9.
65
41
.3
48
.0
Ed
ir
ne
-T
ek
ir
da
g˘-
K
ır
kl
ar
el
i
2
28
,8
21
31
,0
73
31
,5
09
33
,1
87
37
,8
91
45
,7
04
51
,9
47
61
,1
74
69
,9
02
2.
42
3.
20
44
.5
45
.5
Ba
lık
es
ir
-Ç
an
ak
ka
le
3
38
,1
15
43
,9
31
45
,9
16
47
,8
03
51
,5
47
55
,1
75
60
,2
77
66
,8
84
73
,3
09
3.
20
3.
36
45
.5
45
.8
Iz
m
ir
4
72
,7
58
77
,4
92
79
,3
31
80
,1
94
82
,1
71
87
,7
39
92
,0
99
10
0,
63
2
10
8,
09
3
6.
11
4.
95
43
.6
46
.2
D
en
iz
li-
A
yd
ın
-M
ug˘
la
5
43
,9
94
52
,3
54
59
,8
15
65
,5
50
70
,6
44
75
,9
60
78
,1
55
84
,8
37
96
,3
27
3.
69
4.
41
40
.2
46
.7
M
an
is
a-
A
fy
on
-K
üt
ah
ya
-U
sa
k
6
63
,2
15
72
,4
77
77
,6
51
81
,3
24
91
,3
08
98
,1
97
10
1,
64
1
11
1,
22
6
12
5,
19
6
5.
30
5.
73
41
.4
46
.4
Bu
rs
a,
Es
ki
s¸e
hi
r,
Bi
le
ci
k
(O
pe
n
U
ni
ve
rs
it
y)
7
73
,6
80
76
,5
97
77
,7
36
74
,9
64
79
,0
05
84
,8
26
91
,1
05
10
2,
20
9
10
8,
55
4
6.
18
4.
97
44
.1
46
.2
K
oc
ae
li-
Sa
ka
ry
a-
D
üz
ce
-B
ol
u-
Ya
lo
va
8
88
,0
23
10
1,
05
2
11
0,
82
9
11
4,
29
8
12
1,
21
3
12
8,
25
0
13
4,
35
8
14
8,
59
7
16
2,
26
9
7.
39
7.
43
37
.9
43
.7
A
nk
ar
a
9
12
3,
52
1
12
3,
44
6
12
5,
06
8
12
6,
01
1
13
0,
81
8
13
7,
76
3
14
2,
62
0
15
4,
90
5
16
4,
96
1
10
.3
6
7.
55
46
.0
49
.5
K
on
ya
-K
ar
am
an
10
60
,0
75
68
,5
59
73
,3
51
72
,4
80
72
,7
23
75
,4
17
74
,6
46
80
,5
12
86
,7
32
5.
04
3.
97
43
.5
46
.4
A
nt
al
ya
-I
sp
ar
ta
-B
ur
du
r
11
50
,1
25
58
,0
39
61
,8
80
65
,0
06
70
,6
13
77
,2
20
84
,7
53
96
,1
90
11
0,
11
6
4.
21
5.
04
39
.7
42
.4
A
da
na
-M
er
si
n
12
46
,5
72
49
,4
60
50
,1
33
52
,0
26
54
,9
29
59
,9
80
61
,8
04
67
,7
44
72
,6
28
3.
91
3.
32
38
.3
43
.6
H
at
ay
-K
ah
ra
m
an
m
ar
as
-O
sm
an
iy
e
13
26
,2
01
29
,0
56
30
,8
72
33
,3
03
37
,1
62
41
,5
94
45
,8
16
51
,9
53
58
,2
65
2.
20
2.
67
31
.9
37
.5
N
ev
se
hi
r-
A
ks
ar
ay
-N
ig˘
de
-K
ır
ık
ka
le
-K
ır
se
hi
r
14
38
,5
78
40
,5
77
41
,0
11
40
,3
32
44
,5
71
50
,9
02
57
,9
99
70
,0
40
77
,6
24
3.
24
3.
55
39
.7
45
.1
K
ay
se
ri
-S
iv
as
-Y
oz
ga
t
15
45
,6
90
50
,1
14
52
,7
43
54
,6
80
58
,7
95
63
,8
34
70
,8
22
79
,8
41
88
,8
61
3.
83
4.
07
37
.6
45
.4
Z
on
gu
ld
ak
-K
ar
ab
ük
-B
ar
tı
n
16
17
,3
73
19
,3
32
20
,4
61
21
,1
89
22
,9
20
25
,4
91
30
,3
93
38
,2
09
48
,6
56
1.
46
2.
23
35
.7
41
.2
K
as
ta
m
on
u-
Ç
an
kı
rı
-S
in
op
17
13
,0
97
13
,5
85
13
,3
69
13
,4
75
14
,2
85
15
,1
13
17
,5
11
21
,7
33
26
,3
12
1.
10
1.
20
37
.8
43
.2
Sa
m
su
n-
To
ka
t-
Ç
or
um
-A
m
as
ya
18
38
,1
10
41
,6
19
42
,7
66
44
,5
67
49
,3
90
55
,2
96
60
,3
88
69
,5
75
77
,8
44
3.
20
3.
56
41
.8
48
.1
Tr
ab
zo
n-
O
rd
u-
G
ir
es
un
-R
iz
e-
A
rt
vi
n-
G
üm
üs
ha
ne
19
45
,2
80
49
,1
14
53
,3
87
57
,0
83
65
,3
04
74
,2
75
83
,5
91
97
,6
11
10
8,
74
4
3.
80
4.
98
37
.6
44
.6
Er
zu
ru
m
-E
rz
in
ca
n-
Ba
yb
ur
t
20
34
,5
17
35
,6
75
36
,1
79
36
,5
88
38
,8
06
45
,2
31
53
,1
27
62
,0
51
69
,6
77
2.
90
3.
19
38
.7
46
.7
K
ar
s-
A
g˘r
ı-
Ig˘
dı
r-
A
rd
ah
an
21
10
,5
07
12
,4
40
13
,6
07
13
,8
98
15
,2
15
17
,3
30
19
,6
14
22
,0
92
26
,6
12
0.
88
1.
22
34
.6
41
.8
M
al
at
ya
-E
la
zı
g˘-
Bi
ng
öl
-T
un
ce
li
22
32
,8
59
34
,8
49
34
,8
56
34
,7
98
36
,6
44
41
,9
09
49
,0
69
58
,5
11
68
,6
39
2.
76
3.
14
32
.1
41
.2
V
an
-M
us
-B
it
lis
-H
ak
ka
ri
23
13
,2
50
14
,5
58
15
,8
84
16
,5
63
18
,7
10
21
,6
73
26
,2
49
29
,6
77
34
,1
40
1.
11
1.
56
28
.8
38
.8
G
az
ia
nt
ep
-A
dı
ya
m
an
-K
ili
s
24
13
,8
75
15
,5
91
17
,1
64
18
,8
65
22
,9
87
29
,8
58
36
,4
75
42
,4
01
47
,0
14
1.
16
2.
15
36
.9
44
.2
D
iy
ar
ba
kı
r-
Sa
nl
ıu
rf
a
25
19
,5
52
20
,9
05
21
,6
46
21
,7
86
24
,4
56
29
,1
08
32
,7
83
37
,7
82
44
,0
28
1.
64
2.
02
30
.8
40
.4
Si
ir
t-
M
ar
di
n-
Ba
tm
an
-S
ır
na
k
26
5,
22
6
5,
29
7
5,
52
6
5,
63
1
6,
97
7
8,
59
1
11
,2
01
14
,2
86
17
,1
48
0.
44
0.
78
22
.7
36
.9
To
ta
l
1,
19
1,
75
7
1,
28
4,
59
1
1,
33
7,
79
1
1,
37
1,
01
7
1,
46
8,
19
4
1,
60
5,
31
3
1,
73
8,
64
9
1,
95
9,
58
0
2,
18
4,
53
0
10
0.
00
10
0.
00
0
41
.8
45
.8
D
is
ta
nc
e
an
d
O
pe
n
U
ni
ve
rs
it
ie
s
*
69
5,
59
1
79
9,
05
3
84
5,
41
1
87
7,
97
2
1,
14
2,
53
6
1,
55
7,
21
7
1,
71
3,
92
3
1,
94
7,
97
2
2,
24
1,
99
1
Pr
iv
at
e
(V
ak
if
)U
ni
ve
rs
it
ie
s
**
83
,7
42
99
,1
97
10
9,
90
3
12
4,
13
0
14
7,
82
9
16
0,
56
0
17
4,
58
1
20
5,
48
4
25
0,
08
5
Po
pu
la
ti
on
ag
ed
18
-2
4
8,
11
0,
30
2
8,
05
6,
10
9
7,
99
5,
40
8
7,
90
7,
62
3
7,
82
3,
73
6
7,
77
9,
64
9
7,
75
3,
67
3
7,
67
9,
50
9
7,
69
1,
05
1
En
ro
llm
en
tR
at
e
(O
pe
n
Ed
u.
Ex
cl
.)
15
.7
17
.2
18
.1
18
.9
20
.7
22
.7
24
.7
28
.2
31
.7
*
St
at
is
ti
cs
of
M
ea
su
ri
ng
,S
el
ec
ti
on
an
d
Pl
ac
em
en
tC
en
te
r
**
C
al
cu
la
te
d
us
in
g
St
at
is
ti
cs
of
H
ig
he
r
Ed
uc
at
io
n
C
ou
nc
il.
La
te
st
ac
ce
se
d
on
ju
ne
20
15
,h
tt
ps
://
is
ta
ti
st
ik
.y
ok
.g
ov
.tr
/
**
*
C
al
cu
la
te
d
us
in
g
Tu
rk
St
at
H
ou
se
ho
ld
La
bo
r
Su
rv
ey
s(
20
04
-2
01
3)
So
ur
ce
:T
ur
kS
ta
tR
eg
io
na
lS
ta
ti
st
ic
s
10
Although funds have been reallocated towards new universities, total enrollment has been
evenly distributed across all universities. In terms of the number of students enrolled, the
government seems to have increased the burden of existing universities while creating new
capacity through building new ones in each province. Table 3, which shows the evolution of
higher education enrollment by NUTS2 regions, reveals several trends. Firstly, the total number
of students enrolled, including private universities, more than doubled from 2004 to 2012 to
reach almost 2.5 million students. Secondly, the post-secondary education age-population has
gradually fallen by around 0.5% each year. The combined effect of expanding capacity and
declining age population resulted in a remarkable increase in total enrollment rates (table 3,
last row).13 Although the situation in terms of regional share in enrollment is less intuitive.,
peripheral provinces have undoubtedly benefited from the expansion of higher education.
Ankara, the capital province, and Istanbul lost around 3% while eastern provinces more than
doubled the number of enrolled students compared to 2004. The expansion not only favored
less developed eastern provinces but markedly changed the gender composition of enrollment
between 2004 and 2013 in favor of females, as indicated in the final two columns of table 3. The
gender gap closed in all regions, with the ratio of females pursuing higher education increasing
to 46% since the wave of new institutions began in 2006. Lastly, table 3 shows that distance
education also has become significantly important, particularly since 2008, reaching almost
equal weight with traditional education.
Although these developments show that the coverage of higher education has expanded, the
question remains as to whether these improvements have produced more equal opportunities.
Previous studies have found that re-distributive character of subsidizing higher education
is very limited, and Caner and Okten (2013) provides evidence that Turkey is no exception.
Using special data from the central entrance exam of 2002, he found that subsidizing post-
secondary education mostly benefits students from higher income and better educated families,
with household income positively influencing the outcome of the entrance exam. Contrary to
countries (Rozada and Menendez, 2002; Liu et al., 2006) with similar central entrance exams and
dual (public and private) university systems, Caner and Okten (2013) found that students from
higher income families in Turkey have a higher probability of enrolling in private universities.
13Note that there was no significant supply pressure from secondary level graduates that would have stressed
access to higher education during this period.
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Table 4: Higher Education Credit and Hostels Institution Statistics
Public Student Dormitories Number of Students Total Amount of
(No. Of Beds) accessing various public scholarships various scholarships (Thousand Turkish Liras)
Years Girls Boys Total Grant Credit Fee Waiver Grant Credit Fee Waiver
2002 105,247 82,940 188,187 - 451,550 405,791 - 495,664* 124,477*
2003 106,390 83,357 189,747 - 494,070 428,270 - 362,776 73,342
2004 109,168 83,193 192,361 54,724 522,670 459,595 49,348 533,982 93,917
2005 111,898 84,436 196,334 98,110 537,031 481,011 123,570 680,059 113,389
2006 115,190 85,226 200,416 135,497 569,276 505,348 204,167 844,551 124,614
2007 117,441 86,290 203,731 168,923 572,552 451,842 298,532 961,674 127,171
2008 121,316 88,041 209,357 181,490 578,009 466,492 320,823 1,036,282 129,671
2009 132,089 93,024 225,113 198,707 587,131 474,792 375,601 1,213,653 141,242
2010 146,680 99,840 246,520 234,130 611,903 478,601 525,627 1,335,320 152,909
2011 159,866 107,180 267,046 320,912 592,582 494,024 804,125 1,646,005 159,366
2012 187,356 118,022 305,378 348,904 667,359 509,801 1,021,217 1,942,806 162,684
2013 188,920 116,954 305,874 395,679 706,512 ** 1,205,588 2,250,046 **
2014 231,588 136,374 367,962 363,233 872,063 ** 1,173,468 2,936,490 **
Source: General Directorate of Higher Education Credit and Hostels Institution. Annual Reports (2014, 2010,2009)
* Cumulative sum between 1962-2002
** By the year 2013, State university tuition fees are abolished for all students.
It is probable that these higher returns from post-secondary education constitute a strong
incentive for families.
JDP has adopted several practices to accompany its expansionary policy. Higher education
credit and grant coverage has increased significantly at every level, including graduate stud-
ies. In line with this, accommodation facilities for students have significantly been improved
with the involvement of the Housing Development Administration (TOKI), which officially
undertakes public housing investments, particularly since 2010.14
Table 4 displays public policies to facilitate local accommodation for students from other
regions. Taken together, tables 3 and 4 show a remarkable increase in female access to and
enrollment in new universities. Dormitory facility are particularly helpful for female students
from conservative family backgrounds. By the end of 2012, nearly 1.5 million students gained
access to education credits, grants or fee waivers.15 In 2013, university fees were abolished for
all students. We should note that without changing the selection mechanism, which, as Caner
and Okten (2013) show, favors students whose parents can afford better high school quality and
private tutoring, subsidizing tuition and family contributions by abolishing fees guarantees
equity of access to higher education.
It is also worth noting that the increased demand for housing facility coming from students
must have put pressure on rental prices, which benefited rentiers. It is possible that local
housing developments and the increasing number of students are correlated and have some
kind of pecuniary externalities. Non-pecuniary externalities might include certain service
14Law no. 6082 dated 25.11.2010. http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2010/12/20101210-1.html
15University fee waiver and grants are means-tested and generally depend on parental income level.
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Table 5: Enrolled College Students as % of Working Population in NUTS2 regions
Ratio of Enrolled Students (% of population 15-65)* Service Sector Value-added Growth (per capita)**
2004 2006 2009 2010 2011 2012 2004-2007 2007-2009 2009-2011
Istanbul 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.3 19.2 -1.7 13.3
Edirne-Tekirdag˘-Kırklareli 3.3 3.4 4.4 4.9 5.5 6.0 30.7 -0.9 13.2
Balıkesir-Çanakkale 3.7 4.4 5.1 5.6 6.2 6.7 29.0 4.1 4.6
Izmir 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.7 3.9 21.6 0.4 14.0
Denizli-Aydın-Mug˘la 2.8 3.5 4.2 4.2 4.5 4.9 24.7 1.6 3.1
Manisa-Afyon-Kütahya-Usak 3.2 4.0 5.2 5.4 6.0 6.7 31.1 -2.0 6.7
Bursa, Eskis¸ehir, Bilecik (Open University) 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.7 4.1 4.2 25.9 1.5 12.9
Kocaeli-Sakarya-Düzce-Bolu-Yalova 4.7 5.7 6.0 6.1 6.5 6.9 29.3 1.2 22.0
Ankara 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.7 4.9 16.1 4.0 8.2
Konya-Karaman 4.5 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.6 6.0 28.4 3.4 3.2
Antalya-Isparta-Burdur 3.4 4.0 4.6 4.9 5.5 6.0 21.0 1.8 12.7
Adana-Mersin 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.8 3.0 18.7 -0.7 15.5
Hatay-Kahramanmaras-Osmaniye 1.7 1.8 2.4 2.5 2.8 3.0 24.6 2.5 17.0
Nevsehir-Aksaray-Nig˘de-Kırıkkale-Kırsehir 4.3 4.5 5.4 6.0 7.2 7.9 30.9 -1.3 11.5
Kayseri-Sivas-Yozgat 3.3 3.7 4.4 4.8 5.4 6.0 25.4 -2.6 1.8
Zonguldak-Karabük-Bartın 2.6 2.9 3.7 4.3 5.5 6.8 15.0 -6.5 8.8
Kastamonu-Çankırı-Sinop 2.9 2.9 3.3 3.8 4.6 5.4 10.6 0.2 3.1
Samsun-Tokat-Çorum-Amasya 2.2 2.5 3.2 3.5 4.0 4.5 18.1 -0.2 10.9
Trabzon-Ordu-Giresun-Rize-Artvin-Gümüshane 3.0 3.4 4.6 5.1 5.9 6.6 22.9 2.7 2.2
Erzurum-Erzincan-Bayburt 5.5 5.6 7.1 8.4 10.1 11.5 21.3 4.3 4.3
Kars-Ag˘rı-Ig˘dır-Ardahan 1.7 2.4 2.9 3.2 3.4 4.1 21.2 6.8 10.6
Malatya-Elazıg˘-Bingöl-Tunceli 3.5 3.6 4.1 4.7 5.4 6.3 23.0 6.0 2.9
Van-Mus-Bitlis-Hakkari 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.9 23.4 10.1 2.1
Gaziantep-Adıyaman-Kilis 1.1 1.4 2.2 2.5 2.9 3.1 19.3 1.3 15.6
Diyarbakır-Sanlıurfa 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.2 21.5 1.6 17.7
Siirt-Mardin-Batman-Sırnak 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 37.8 5.8 25.5
* Source: TurkStat Household Labor Surveys (2004-2012). Population figures are calculated using factor weights.
** Source: TurkStat Regional Statistics, last accessed on July 6, (http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/Bolgesel/anaSayfa.do)
sectors emerging within these districts due to increased demand. It seems that this policy has
attracted some complaints from local residents, whose concerns were echoed by the prime
minister in claiming that mixed-gender student accommodation was against conservative
values. As a result, female-only dormitories are being increased to match the growing demand.
Table 4 shows that from 2009 to 2014, significant progress was made to increase the capacity of
female dormitories, with the number of beds increasing by 100,000 in 5 years through the help
of TOKI.
Enhanced access, accommodation and grants specific to post-secondary education have
brought upheaval to networks already operating mostly through religious charity finance.16
Without continuing the discussion on political or faith-based organizational networks, we need
to mention that economic rents related to private provision may be weakened by public provi-
sion through a crowding-out effect. Thus, new local political rents will probably emerge around
the local organization and provision of public services related to post-secondary education.
Increasing capacity by establishing new universities has another dimension in terms of
political economy. Increasing enrollment and investment in higher education contribute to
16Faith-based organizations and movements, which gained power through private provision of accommodation
and grants and has already established secondary education and private tutoring institutions. In fact, political
welfare redistribution, which is more universal inevitably challenged conservative communitarian provision, which
lasted nearly thirty years.
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local development by promoting domestic demand. The left-hand side of Table 5 displays total
enrolled public university students as a percentage of the working population of provinces
while the right-hand side presents the growth of the service sector for comparison. The fact
that in some regions total enrollment has increased far more than the working population
reveals the contribution of demand created by this increased capacity. In small cities where
the relative share of manufacturing is low, demand externalities maintained economic growth
during the 2007-2009 recession.
3 Proximity Effect and Localization
Expansion in higher education and increased university accommodation and grants facilities
are expected to increase mobility in terms of access and regional dynamics. One probable
outcome of these structural changes could take two channels. One is the usual cost effect,
which is more important for less well-resourced families. Despite increased access, the costs
associated with residing abroad may deter certain families. Thus, proximity will likely increase
enrollment of local students. Turley (2009) argues that college proximity facilitates the transition
to college for families both financially and emotionally. Turley (2009) finds that students from
a lower family income background are more likely to attend a nearby college. She concludes
that proximity helps to increase college enrollment of locals particularly for less well-resourced
families. The second channel might be related to cultural values, which mostly concern female
students and their families. Regarding the preferences of Hispanic students to attend nearby
colleges, for example, Desmond and Turley (2009) argues that attitudinal familism (a strong
sense of attachment to family members) can be a strong motive besides socio-economic factors.
As already discussed, female college enrollment has increased dramatically in Turkey since the
2006 expansion (Table 3). We can argue that proximity may affect the increased share of female
students through channels we can not identify through our data. In the US, Riegle-Crumb (2010)
shows that both Hispanic and white females have higher enrollment rates than their male peers
due to stronger academic performance and more academically oriented social relationships
and networks. If we assume that, in poorer regions of Turkey, more conservative families are
unwilling to send their daughters to distant cities, it is possible that college proximity serves
as an incentive for local residents.
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In order to show which regions were most affected, we ran a probit estimation for twelve
NUTS1 regions in 2012 as a treatment to indicate the presence of college proximity.17 We use
yearly cross-sections of Household Labor Force Surveys (HLFS) between 2002-2014. HLFS
provides detailed information on labor market outcomes, such as wages and working hours,
using a representative sample at regional NUTS2 level. We estimated the following equ. 1:
Pr(PSi,t = 1) = φ
(
β1Fi,t + β2Ti,t + β3Fi,t ∗ Ti,t) (1)
where φ is the cumulative distribution. The dependent variable PSi,r,t is a dummy variable
with the value 0 if the child is aged between 18 and 25, completed secondary school but did
not proceed to post-secondary level, and 1 if the child is aged between 18 and 25, completed
secondary school and enrolled in a post-secondary institution. The subscripts indicate year
t. Fi,t is a dummy variable with the value 1 if the father of the child completed secondary or
post-secondary education and 0 if he has a lower level. We ran separate regressions for each
NUTS1 region. In each estimation we were interested in the sign of the dummy variable to
capture the interaction between the effect of paternal education and the year.18
Table 6 displays the probit estimation of students residing with their parents and attending
nearby colleges. Localization might also reflect compositional change, meaning that less edu-
cated families increase relative to others but not necessarily at the level of sending children to
college. Therefore, we have to look at the sign of the year effect. A negative and significant in-
teraction term indicates that in the Eastern Black Sea, Northeast and Southeast Anatolia regions
relative to year 2004, daughters whose father’s education was less than secondary level are
more likely to attend a local college whereas there is no such an effect for sons. It is interesting
that there is significant and positive year effect for 2013 for both females and males. These
results imply two complementary trends: one is that the presence of a nearby college increase
the likelihood of local attendance; the other is that educational mobility is higher for females
in conservative regions. We will call this effect localization in post-secondary education. We
should note that the model bears some bias due to income effect in that college preferences are
formed according to success in the central entrance exam. Children of wealthier families who
17The choice of treatment year does not mainly change sign of the effects. The regression table with 2013 as the
treatment year is available upon request.
18Household labor surveys are addressed-based so household members residing elsewhere are not counted.
Consequently, we do not include children who are enrolled in a distant college and not residing with their parents.
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can provide better education and private tutoring can more easily access top-ranked colleges
that are mostly located in major cities.
We can speculate that this trend has some effects on economic dynamics within each re-
gion although there are no studies directly evaluating the externalities of new universities on
economic dynamics. Regional selection also has interesting effects on post-secondary edu-
cation mobilization in that localization will slow down the regional mobility of the region’s
educated labor force, and may even help to develop a new kind of human capital formation
with stronger local attachments. However, it is unlikely that these emerging universities will
sufficiently meet the conditions to develop local dynamics and develop a critical mass given
they are still new. Generally, these externalities could be significant for individual regions in
that demand externalities can account to a remarkable point after 2006 when new universities
expanded their capacity. In nearly half of the regions (13 out of 26), the ratio of students enrolled
in post-secondary education exceeded 6% of the working population, with Table 5 showing an
increase both through time and across all regions. Combined with distributive grants and a
credit policy (Table 4), it would not be wrong to argue that the local demand created by college
students, together with other externalities with real estate and housing, local dynamics has
contributed to local economies throughout JDP’s political tenure.
4 Regional Returns to Higher Education
There is an extensive literature on returns to education and wage structure, and factors acting
on wage inequality. USA-based studies mainly discuss the role of technology and labor market
institutions. Despite an increase in the supply of workers with higher education, Acemoglu
(2000) argues that technical change has been a driving factor in the rise of skill returns. David
et al. (1997) provides evidence for skilled-biased technical change that favors the compensation
of more highly educated workers. Barth and Lucifora (2006) found no effect of supply shock
(higher education expansion) on the relative wage dispersion of skilled workers for 12 European
countries. A number of studies, such as Bakis and Polat (2015) and Filiztekin (2015), discuss
the importance of wage income in the structural transition to paid or more appropriately
market labor. The net transition accounts for more than 10% of the labor force during the
last decade. Most of these workers are prime wage earners that have moved from locally
16
defined jobs to market ones. This observation gains support from the fact that the previously
locally tied network structure of cities has experienced a structural change to become more
complex, more integrated and less communitarian. In Turkey’s case, comparing the year
effect in both regressions (Table 6), we see that for locals, the probability of attending post-
secondary education has increased across all regions. There might be several factors acting
on the decision to attend college. One might be the incentive created by higher marginal
returns to post-secondary education. Another is the incentive to reside in rather than migrate
from a region, which might reflect lower selective migration. If, for local marginal returns to
higher education, there is a tendency to equate across regions, the localization effect is likely
to persist, which justifies the college proximity argument. In order to account for these trends,
we estimate a simple wage regression described in Equ. 2
ln(hw)i,t = β0 + β1Ei,t + β2Pi,t + β3Ti,t + i,t (2)
The sample for real hourly wage regressions is restricted to male wage earners aged 24-39
to avoid an insufficient number of observations and selection bias emerging from participation
issues for women. In Equ. 2, P, T and S stand for potential experience, firm-specific tenure and a
public employee dummy respectively. EducationE is taken as categorical and roughly grouped
into four levels.19 Table 7 summarizes the results of the basic Mincerian wage regression given
in Equ. 2 for each region for pooled cross-sections of 2004-2005 and 2013-2014 data.
19Salehi-Isfahani et al. (2009) argues that individual returns to years of education show non-linearities for Turkey
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The last rows of Table 7 show marginal returns to post-secondary education with respect to
secondary20 and primary level. Compared to the 2004-05 pooled regressions, marginal returns
to secondary education to post-secondary has increased in regions where higher education has
expanded, particularly for Turkey’s eastern provinces, although this does not hold for primary
education level. For 1988, 1994 and 2003, Salehi-Isfahani et al. (2009) found that marginal
returns to graduating from post-secondary level with respect to secondary level increased.
He argues the that increasing trend of marginal returns despite the expansion of education is
related more with labor demand conditions and the sophisticated structure of the economy,
since a similar expansion in Iran did not result in increases for individual returns.21 Higher
returns to college might reflect technological changes which favor skilled labor. Bakis and
Polat (2015) also argues that it is rather skill biased structural change, implying that within
effects are larger than between effects. Whatever the reason behind the higher relative marginal
returns, increased labor demand coupled with economic growth stimulate attendance of higher
education in the eastern region. Another interesting results is the public-private differential,
whereby public employees earn more than private ones but still the premium increases in
less developed regions. This implies that amenity differentials compensated in public sector.
The fact that Istanbul has the highest marginal returns to post-secondary education supports
the claim that highly educated workers sort into regions like Istanbul as Turkey’s largest city.
Related to our previous remark on localization, regional estimates show that, in terms of
returns, there is a slow convergence over time.
Several implications from these findings for female wage earners need to be emphasized.
It is evident that expansion of education at every level increases labor force participation for
younger generations, (Dayıog˘lu and Kırdar, 2010). For higher education, this upward trend
should be coupled with an expansion of public sector jobs where gender selection is more
likely. From the perspective of political economy there are two implications. Firstly, the public
sector, being a major employer in the field of education and health, should grow to address the
needs of mothers for childcare and elderly health in order to increase labor participation rates.22
20Regular and vocational high schools are merged into one category in order to avoid confusion.
21Salehi-Isfahani et al. (2009) found a higher returns to education for 2003 with a sample including individuals
aged 20-59 and estimations basically involving potential experience and education variables. Tansel and Bodur
(2012) found a decline in returns to education for 2002 compared to 1994, which he attributed to insufficient labor
demand due to the 2001 crisis.
22Bakis et al. (2013) reports that increasing the college share of employment in regions promotes social returns to
education, particularly for women.
20
Secondly, the political demand for gender-specific job creation will increase with the additional
supply of educated women that have benefited mostly from the removal of restrictions on access
to public work for women wearing head-scarves and from localization in more conservative
regions, as already discussed.
5 Conclusion
This paper focused on the economic and political consequences of higher education expansion
in Turkey in the last decade. The creation of new universities, which was initiated as a political
move targeting regional development, emerged as a re-distributive policy reorienting public
investment and funds toward poorer eastern regions of Turkey. This expansion, which has
almost doubled enrollment rates since 2004, was accompanied by a subsidy policies facilitating
more education grants and fee waivers, and heavy investment in public student accommo-
dation. We provided a detailed account of regional dynamics and developments around the
new emerging universities. We also discussed the institutional background regarding several
restrictions on access to higher education which marked a series of political events inherited
from the decade before JDP came to power. In terms of economic consequences, JDP’s expan-
sion policy has affected local economies through demand externality which, in some regions,
doubled the share of enrolled students and channeled more public investment and expendi-
ture. These developments have also significantly reduced gender differences in regional college
enrollment rates. We highlighted several impacts of this expansion on labor market dynamics.
Firstly, it had a re-distributive effect for daughters from families with low parental education
levels, through what we call ‘localization’. Secondly, there was (slow) convergence in terms of
marginal returns to higher education as compared to the pre-expansion period.
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